Abstract. Differential privacy is a privacy notion in statistical databases. However, we find that the notion can be extended to mathematical functions. By studying the differential privacy problem of a simple mathematical function we find two differentially private mechanisms which are applicable for almost all query functions. By using these mechanisms each query function can have custom-designed mechanisms, which implies that our mechanisms are not based on (global or local) sensitivitybased methods-some methods extensively used to construct differentially private mechanisms. Our mechanisms are so flexible that they can be used to balance the accuracy of the outputs of different datasets. We also present some interesting impossibility results of differential privacy. The above results motivate us to explore the mathematical treatment of differential privacy. We present an abstract model of differential privacy in which a differential privacy problem is modeled as finding a randomized mapping between two metric spaces. Some basic structures of differential privacy are presented, such as the {I x i }i, {R x i }i sequences. Some of the properties of these structures, such as the convergence, are also discussed (for some special cases). Finally, we apply our theoretical results to the subgraph counting problem and the linear query problem. The experiments show that our mechanisms (in most cases) have more accurate results than the state of the art mechanisms.
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Introduction
Differential privacy studies how to query dataset while preserving the privacy of those people whose sensitive informations are contained in the dataset. The key of the problem is to find efficient method to query sensitive dataset to obtain (relatively) accurate results while satisfying differential privacy. The global sensitivity-based method [1, 2] is an efficient and widely used method to achieve differential privacy. Explicitly, the global sensitivity of a query function [1] or a utility function [2] is its maximum difference when evaluated on any two neighbouring datasets (differing on at most one record), and the global sensitivity-based method is to perturb the query result with noise of magnitude proportional to the global sensitivity. Due to the poor accuracy of the global sensitivity-based method when the global sensitivity is large, the smooth sensitivity-based method [3] and the local sensitivity-based method [4] among others [5, 6, 7] are presented, where the local sensitivity of a query f on a dataset x is the maximum difference of f (x) with the value of its any neighboring dataset, and the smooth sensitivity is a compromise between the global sensitivity and the local sensitivity. The (global or local) sensitivity has long been seen as a mark of the minimum noise needed in order to satisfy differential privacy in practice. However, there is seldom theoretical result to support this point. Our question is: Does there exist query function which has very large (global or local) sensitivity but has (relatively) accurate differentially private query results?
To answer this question, we should first understand differential privacy in a simple way. However, we find that most differential privacy problems [8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 6] are so complicated that it is not a good idea to understand differential privacy from these problems. Therefore, we try to understand differential privacy by using a simple example which, at first glance, seems not a privacy protection problem at all. Example 1. Let the function f : R → R be defined in (1) .
x if x is a rational number −x if x is an irrational number (1) Let d denote the Euclidean distance on R. Then f is a mapping between two metric spaces (d, R) and (d, R). We denote the first metric space as (d, D), and the second as (d, R) for the convenience of illustration. We define the differential privacy problem of f (x) as follows. Two elements x, x ∈ D are said to be neighbors if 0 <d(x, x ) ≤ 1. A randomized function M satisfies -differential privacy if for any neighbors x, x ∈ D, and for any measurable S ⊆ R, there is
The question is: Does there exist a differentially private mechanism M which satisfies that f (x) and M(x) are statistically close for all (or almost all) x ∈ D?
The first choice to treat Example 1 would be the Laplace mechanism [1] , which is a global sensitivity-based method. However, this technique does not work for Example 1 since the global sensitivity of f is ∆f = max
x,x ∈D:x,x are neighbors
The smooth sensitivity-based method [3] and the local sensitivity-based method [4] both also do not work due to the large local sensitivity of f for most points in D.
Can we design a mechanism to achieve high accuracy while satisfying differential privacy for Example 1? Is the large (global or local) sensitivity of f deemed to poor accuracy? In the paper, we will give these questions some answers.
Contribution
The contributions are as follows.
We find a way to understand differential privacy from the mathematical view. By studying the differential privacy problem of Example 1 we find two differentially private mechanisms which are applicable for almost all query functions (not just the traditional query functions in differential privacy but also the functions in mathematics). By using these mechanisms each query function can have its own custom-designed mechanisms. That is, these mechanisms can assign probability to each point in the codomain of f according to the properties (the {I x i } i , {R x i } i sequences in the paper) of f . These mechanisms are so flexible that they can be used to balance the accuracy of the outputs of different datasets (by setting different δ for different points in the {R x i } i sequences). From this aspect, we could say that these mechanisms touch the "microworld" of differential privacy that the sensitivity-based methods can't.
We also present some interesting impossibility results of differential privacy which show a tight relation between accuracy and sensitivity. Roughly speaking, these results say that, for two neighboring datasets x, y ∈ D, if |f (x) − f (y)| is large, then there is no differentially private mechanism by which both the outputs of x, y are accurate. Although the proofs of these results are simple, to our knowledge, they are the first to appear in differential privacy.
Furthermore, we present an abstract model of differential privacy in which a differential privacy problem is modeled as finding a randomized mapping between two metric spaces. The privacy is modeled as the property of the randomized mapping to the first metric space and the accuracy is modeled as the property of the randomized mapping to the second metric space. Under this consideration, the abstract differential privacy problem seems more hard than the metric embedding problem which only needs to keep the distance of the first metric space. Some basic structures of differential privacy are presented, such as the {I x i } i , {R x i } i sequences in the paper. Some of the properties of these structures, such as the convergence, are also discussed (for some special cases).
Finally, we apply our theoretical results to the subgraph counting problem and the linear query problem. The experiments show that our mechanisms (in most cases) have more accurate results than the state of the art mechanisms. The results of the linear queries show an interesting phenomenon: Being contrary to the sensitivity-based mechanisms which have monotonic (from the center to two sides) density functions (such as the Laplace density function), our mechanisms generate some density functions which are not monotonic at all.
Related Works
As discussed in Section 1, the sensitivity-based methods are extensively used to construct differentially private mechanisms. These methods include the global sensitivity-based method [1, 2] , the smooth sensitivitybased method [3] , the local sensitivity-based method [4] among others [5, 6, 7] . Different from these methods, our mechanisms do not resort on the notion of sensitivity at all. The detail is discussed in Section 4.3. Due to this reason, our mechanisms can treat what the sensitivity-based methods can't, such as the infinite sensitivity problem in Example 1.
We model the differential privacy problem as finding a randomized mapping between two metric spaces. There are somewhat similar treatments about these concepts in [14, 15] . Our treatment is different from theirs in the following aspect. The papers [14, 15] mainly focus on either generalizing the differential privacy to a broaden scope or unifying the current problems or methods in differential privacy, whereas ours mainly focuses on the mathematical understanding and treatment of differential privacy. We try to find methods from mathematical views.
Traditionally, the exponential mechanism [2] is seen as a general mechanism for all query functions. However, the utility function used in the exponential mechanism is not presented explicitly, which means that one needs to design the utility function when using the exponential mechanism. However, how to design a good utility function is not known. Our mechanisms (at least theoretically) give some explicit ways about how to construct differentially private mechanisms for almost all query functions. The detailed discussions are presented in Section 4.3.
The batch linear queries problems [16, 17, 18, 19] are studied extensively in differential privacy. These works focus on the dependence (such as linear dependence) among the batch linear queries. In order to improve the accuracy, they first compress the high-dependent linear queries to the low-dependent or independent linear queries of small numbers and then use a differentially private mechanism, such as the Laplace mechanism, on the later, or as a whole. Our work can be used to treat the later lowdependent or independent linear queries to improve the accuracy of the whole of the batch linear queries.
There are a large amount of works [20, 21, 22, 23] which approximate the batch linear queries to a dataset x by the batch linear queries to another dataset y, a synthetic dataset. These works are based on the statistical property of both the query functions and the arguments, i.e., the datasets. Our work does not treat these approximation problems.
Metric embedding [24] seems to have deep connection to differential privacy. The paper [25] uses the Johnson-Lindenstrauss transform to construct differentially private mechanism for some applications, such as PCA, Minimum cut query. The paper [26] uses a variant of Bourgain's theorem to solve k-means distances problem in differential privacy. Our work abstract the differential privacy problem as finding a randomized mapping between two metric spaces which seems similar with the randomized metric embedding problem [24] . The detailed discussions about their differences are presented in Section 3.5.
The impossibility results in [27] and the low bounds results in [9, 8, 28] mainly focus on either the linear queries or the low-sensitivity queries, whereas our impossibility results in section 4.2 are not limited either to the linear queries or to the low-sensitivity queries. 
Outline
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives two mechanisms to achieve differential privacy of Example 1. It discusses how to accurately achieve differential privacy for Example 1, how to balance the accuracy of different datasets and what is the impossibility for the accuracy. Section 3 gives the abstract model of differential privacy, which abstract a differential privacy problem as finding a randomized mapping between two metric spaces problem. Section 4 generalizes the results in Section 2 to general differential privacy problems defined in Section 3. In Section 5 we apply the mechanisms in Section 4 to the subgraph counting problem and the linear query problem. Finally, concluding remarks and a discussion of future work are presented in Section 6.
Notations
LetN denote the set of the natural numbers including 0. LetQ = R − Q. For a set S ⊆ R n , let Vol(S) denote the measure of S on the Lebesgue measure m on R n . For the discrete case, let Vol(S) denote the number of elements in S, i.e., Vol(S) = |S|.
Achieving Differential Privacy for Example 1
In this section, we see how to design differentially private mechanisms for Example 1. The results in this section greatly inspired us in obtaining the general results in Section 4.
Let D, R be denoted as in Example 1. For x ∈ D let p x (r), r ∈ R denote the probability density function of M(x). Our idea to construct p x (r) is simple: the more far away of y ∈ D from x the more smaller of p x (f (y)). The details are as follows. Let N x i = {y ∈ D : i−1 < |x−y| ≤ i} denote the set of neighbors of x of distance i, and let
, where α x = i∈N e −i µ(I x i ) and µ is the Lebesgue measure on R. Note that
Note also that µ(I x i ) = 2 for all i ∈ N and all x ∈ D. Then,
for all x ∈ D. For any neighbors x, x ∈ D and any r ∈ R, assuming that r ∈ I x i ∩ I x j , one can verify that j ∈ {i − 1, i, i + 1}. We have
Therefore, the mechanism M is -differentially private.
Accuracy Analysis
Now we analyze the utility of the mechanism M. Let T ∈ Z + be a positive integer. If x ∈ Z + such that T < 2x, there is
Other cases of x ∈ Q can be treated similarly as above.
From the above two probabilities we can see that, for the utility of the mechanism M, the case of x ∈Q is largely accurate than the case of x ∈ Q, especially when |x| is very large. Recalling that µ(Q) = 0, we obtain a mechanism which has accurate outputs with probability measure 1 on D.
Impossibility Result
Now that, by Section 2.1, the mechanism M has only points in D of zero probability measure which have inaccurate outputs, can we design a mechanism which has accurate outputs for every points in D for Example 1? The answer is negative. The reason is as follow. Let T be a large positive integer. Let x ∈ Q, y ∈Q such that |x−y| < 1 (meaning that x, y are neighbors) and x, y 2T . Assume that there exists one -differentially private mechanism M such that Pr[|M (
Therefore,
The above results show that it is impossible to find an -differentially private mechanism which has good accuracy at both x and y when is small. Now that, for any differentially private mechanism, it is impossible to achieve good accuracy at both x, y, can we balance the accuracy between x and y?
Balance Accuracy
In this section, we present a differentially private mechanism M which is a variant of M in Section 2. The mechanism M can balance the the accuracy between the points in Q and the points inQ compared to M. For the clarity of illustration, we only treat the case x ∈ Z + and the case x ∈Q + with x ≈ [x]. Other cases can be treated similarly.
Our idea of constructing M is direct: The inaccuracy at the points x ∈ Q of M is due to the fact that most of the values f (y) are assigned a small density value if y ∈ D is near to x. Therefore, we can set a large density value to the values of most of those points near to x. The details of constructing M are as follows. For any x ∈ D, set R x 0 = {r ∈ R :
i is some what complicated than I x i of the mechanism M. This is due to the fact that each point f (y) ∈ R is extended to the interval f (y) + [−1, 1] and that R x i may have overlapped points with R x j when i > j and therefore these overlapped points should be removed from R x i . As in Section 2, for any r ∈ R x i , set p x (r) = 1 α x e −i , where α x = i∈N e −i µ(R x i ). In this way, we can balance M's accuracy between the points in Q and the points inQ. The details of the analysis are as follows.
In the following of this section we set |x| > 2 for the clarity of illus-
For i ≥ x, we have
Then, one can prove that
p y (r) ≤ e × α y /α x ≤ e 2 for any neighbors x, y ∈ D and any r ∈ R as in (3). Therefore, the mechanism M is 2 -differentially private.
We now analyze the accuracy of the above mechanism M . Let T be a positive integer such that T 2x. If x ∈ Z + , we have
For x ∈Q + with x ≈ x , we have
Other cases can be treated similarly. Note that the above two probabilities are approximately the same and therefore can be seen as a balance of the corresponding two probabilities in Section 2.1.
The Abstract Model of Differential Privacy
In Section 2, we see that Example 1, a pure mathematical example, has the similar problems, i.e., privacy-accuracy tradeoffs, as the differential privacy in the computer science [1] . Therefore, it is needed to unify the two fields for common development. In this section, we give an abstract model of differential privacy, whose intention is to understand differential privacy from theoretical or mathematical view. There are somewhat similar treatments in [14, 15] . The difference of ours from theirs is discussed in Section 1.2.
The Detaset Metric Space and the Value Metric Space
The dataset universe is modeled as a set D over which a metricd is defined.
Definition 1 (Dataset Metric Space
The product metric space and the product probability space are used to model the batch query functions. (R 1 , d 1 ) , . . . , (R n , d n ) are metric spaces, and N is the Euclidean norm on R n , then
Definition 3 (Product Metric Space). If
is a metric space, where the product metric is defined by y 1 ) , . . . , d n (x n , y n ) , and the induced topology agrees with the product topology.
Definition 4 (Product Probability Space). Let (R 1 , B 1 , µ 1 ) , . . . , (R n , B n , µ n ) be n probability spaces. Then the probability space (R, B, µ), defined by R = R 1 × · · · ×R n , B = B 1 × · · · × B n and µ = µ 1 × · · · × µ n , is called the product probability space of the n probability spaces.
For n query functions f 1 , . . . , f n over the dataset metric space (D,d), let (R 1 , d 1 ) , . . . , (R n , d n ) be their value metric spaces respectively. Then the product metric space 
where we abuse the notation M(x) as either denoting a probability distribution in ∆(R) or denoting a random variable following the probability distribution.
Theorem 1 (Combination Theorem
i -differentially private on the product probability space (R, B).
Proof. The proof is similar with the one of Theorem 3.14 in [29] and is omitted.
Utility Model
Let (R, d) be the value metric space of f . Set C x T = {r ∈ R : d(f (x), r) ≤ T } for all x ∈ D, where T > 0. We use the probability P x T to measure the accuracy of M at the point x, where
We use the set {P x T : x ∈ D} to measure the accuracy of M. An alternative to P x T is to use the expected value of the distance d(M(x), f (x)), i.e.,
where F x (r) is the cumulative distribution function of M(x).
Note that the accuracy of the batch queries is measured on their product value metric space. Note also that the functions compression method is applicable in our model to improve the batch queries' accuracy as discussed in Section 1.2.
Query Function
Linear function is known to be one kind of the simplest query functions in differential privacy, which is a generalization of the sum function or the counting function.
Definition 6 (Linear Function). Assume the value metric space (R, d)
is a linear space. For all x, y ∈ D, if {f (x ) − f (x) : x ∈ N x } = {f (y ) − f (y) : y ∈ N y }, the function f is said to be a linear (query) function.
Since for a linear function f the set {f (x ) − f (x) : x ∈ N x }, denoted as V f , is the same for all x ∈ D and seems different from other linear functions, we may use it to denote the function f if without ambiguity. We call the set V f the neighborhood set of the linear function f . Any query function, which is not a linear function, is said to be a non-linear (query) function.
Definition 7 (Monotonic Function). The function f is said to be a monotonic (query) function
for any x ∈ D and any y, z ∈ D such thatd(x, y) >d(x, z).
Definition 8 (Permutation Function and Identity Function). An injective function f is called a permutation function if its value metric space (R, d) is the same as the dataset metric space (D,d). Moreover, if f (x) = x for all x ∈ D, then f is called an identity function.
The identity function is used to model the data publication problem [30, 31] in differential privacy.
Discussion
By the above definitions, the differential privacy of a function f is to find a randomized mapping M from the dataset metric space (D,d) to the value metric space (R, d). Note that M is a differentially private approximation of f . Differential privacy needs the mapping M should control the upper bound of the distance of the outputs (random variables) according to the distance of the inputs. The distance between the random variables is measured by the inequality (4). On the other hand, the utility needs the mapping M should, when inputting x ∈ D, output a random variable M(x) which is a good approximation to f (x). This implies that high utility means that the outputs of the mapping M should keep the distance of the metric space (R, d). That is, if d(f (x), f (y)) is large, then the two random variables M(x), M(y) should also have large distance. Note that there would be a contradiction if both high privacy and high utility need holding whend(x, y) is small but d(f (x), f (y)) is large. Therefore, there should be a tradeoff between privacy and utility. Furthermore, from Section 2 we can see that there is another tradeoff in differential privacy which balances the accuracy of M among the different elements of (D,d).
In the next section we will give some concrete solutions for these tradeoffs and give some impossibility results.
Note that the differential privacy problem presented above is different from the randomized metric embedding problem in [24] where one needs to find a randomized mapping M between two metric spaces (D,d), (R, d) such that, for any x, y ∈ D, there is
with probability 1 − η. Although both of them treat the randomized mapping problem between two metric spaces, there are several major differences. First, in the differential privacy there is one query function f between two metric spaces but non in the randomized metric embedding. Second, in the randomized metric embedding the randomized mapping M should keep the distance of the first metric space by the inequality (5). However, in the differential privacy, the privacy requirement needs the randomized mapping M only control the upper bound of the distance of the outputs according to the distance of the inputs using the inequality (4), which implies that the case where the outputs of the randomized mapping are the same is allowable. Third, in the differential privacy the high utility implies the outputs of M should keep the distance of the second spaces. However, the above implication is not reversible since there may be the case where the outputs of M keeps the distance of the second metric but the utility is low. One drawback of the abstract model of differential privacy is that there are may differential privacy problems whose utility functions are not metrics [30, 31] . However, we believe that the model captures the core issue of differential privacy, i.e., the privacy-utility tradeoff. Figuring out the problems in the model would be the cornerstone to understand the whole field of differential privacy.
Note that, by the results of this section, any function f can have its own differential privacy problem so long as its domain and codomain both are metric spaces. Therefore, an SQL query function may have the same (or similar) differential privacy problem as a mathematical function. From this aspect we can say that it is the obligation not just of computer scientists but also of mathematicians to figure out differential privacy.
General Result
In this section, we see how to generalize the ideas and the methods in Section 2 to treat the abstract query problems in differential privacy defined in Section 3. We first construct the set sequence {I , N x i andN x i are defined as in Section 3.1, i ∈N. We have the following lemma for the the set sequence {I x i } i . Lemma 1. Let x, x ∈ D be neighbors. Then, for any s, t ∈N such that |s − t| ≥ 2, there have that ∪ i∈N I x i = R and that I x t ∩ I x s = ∅. Proof. We first prove ∪ t i=0
by the assumption. If j = k then there is no i < k such that r ∈ A x i by the minimality of j. We
for all x ∈ D, t ∈N. We next prove I x t ∩ I x s = ∅. Without loss of generality, set s ≤ t − 2. Since I x t = ∪ y∈N x t I y 0 − A x t−1 , for any r ∈ I x t , we have that there exists y ∈ D such thatd(x, y) = t and r = f (y), and that for any y ∈ D such thatd(x, y ) ≤ t − 1 there has r = f (y ). On the other hand, for any r ∈ I x s , there existsx ∈ D such thatd(x, x ) = s and r = f (x). Sinced(x,x) ≤d(x, x ) +d(x ,x) = 1 + s ≤ t − 1, we have r = r , which implies I x t ∩ I x s = ∅. The claims are proved. Similar as in Section 2, we now construct a mechanism M as follows. For any x ∈ D and any r ∈ R set the density function of M(x) as p x (r) = Proof. Let x, x ∈ D be neighbors. For any r ∈ R, assuming r ∈ I x i ∩ I x j , there is j ∈ {i − 1, i, i + 1} by Lemma 1. Therefore,
The proof is complete.
Balance Accuracy
In this section, we construct a differentially private mechanism, which is a variant of the one in Theorem 2. The construction of the mechanism is similar with the one in Section 2.3.
For each x ∈ D and a nonnegative real number δ x , set R
and B x i = B
x,δ i for notational simplicity when there is no ambiguity.
Lemma 2. Let x, x ∈ D be neighbors. Then, for any s, t ∈N such that |s − t| ≥ 2, there have that ∪ i∈N R x i = R and that R x t ∩ R x s = ∅. Proof. The proof of Lemma 2 is similar with the one of Lemma 1 and is omitted.
We now construct a mechanism M as follows. For any x ∈ D and any r ∈ R set the density function of M(x) as p x (r) =
Proof. The proof of Theorem 3 is similar with the one of Theorem 2 and is omitted.
Impossibility Result
The impossibility result in Section 2.2 is generalized as follows. Set C x T = {r ∈ R : d(f (x), r) ≤ T } for all x ∈ D, where T > 0. We have the following result.
Lemma 3. Assume that there is y ∈ N x i such that f (y) ∈ C x 2T , where i ∈ N. Assume also that M is an -differentially private mechanism such that
by the inequality (4). Then
where the first inequality is due to C x T ∩C y T = ∅, and the second inequality is due to (7) .
The claim is proved.
Lemma 3 says that if x, y ∈ D are close in the metric space (D,d) and f (x), f (y) are far away in the metric space (R, d), then there is no differentially private mechanism which can achieve good accuracy at both x, y. We have the following impossibility result by Lemma 3. 2T for all y ∈ D 2 . Assume that M is one -differentially private mechanism. Set max(η, 1 − e −i + e −i η) < 1/2. There then does not exist set D ⊆ D, which satisfies
Discussion
The mechanism in Theorem 2 is only related to the the metricd, no needing the participation of the second metric d. This is a vital feature which differentiates the mechanism from the sensitivity-base methods which need the second metric d, or at least a utility function u x (r), to compute the (global or local) sensitivity [1, 2, 3, 4] . The mechanism in Theorem 2 can be seen as a mechanism only considering the need of privacy since the metric d, the measure of the utility, is not used at all.
The accuracy of the mechanism can be measured by P x T in the equation (8) which indicates that, in general, the mechanism is not suitable for the non-monotonic functions (Definition 7) since non-monotonic function may have smaller value of µ(I x i ∩ C x T ) for smaller i. The mechanism in Theorem 3 extends the set I x 0 = {f (x)} in Theorem 2 into a ball R x 0 = {r ∈ R : d(r, f (x)) ≤ δ x }. This mechanism can be seen as an optimized variant of the mechanism in Theorem 2 when considering the need of the metric d, i.e., the need of utility.
The accuracy of the mechanism can be measured by P x T in the equation (9) .
The above two mechanisms show a way to solve the abstract differential privacy problem presented in Section 3. Note that they will give each query function some custom-designed probability distributions due to the (in general) uniqueness of the {I x i } i , {R x i } i sequences of the function. 
Application
In this section, we apply the two mechanisms presented in Section 4 to the subgraph counting problem and the linear query problem.
Application in Subgraph Counting
Subgraph counting is one important problem in differential privacy [7, 6, 5, 4] . We use the edge differential privacy as in [4] . That is, two graphs are said to be neighbors if the difference of their edges is 1. We count the number of triangles in a graph. The corresponding algorithm is shown in Algorithm 1, which implements the mechanism in Theorem 2 and outputs the set sequence {I the set of all the graphs with the number of nodes equals n and D denotes the set of all non-isomorphic graphs in G n . The algorithm for the mechanism in Theorem 3 is similar with Algorithm 1 and is omitted. The accuracy of the mechanism M at g i is measured using the expected value of the distance d(M(g i ), f (g i )) as in Section 3.3, i.e.,
where f (g i ) denotes the number of triangles in the graph g i , p g i (r) dentes the probability of r in the mechanism M when the input is g i , and R = {f (g i ) : g i ∈ D}. We compare the accuracy of our mechanisms to the one in [4 
] of our mechanism and mean (g i ) denotes the corresponding expected value at g i of the Ladder mechanism.
The details of the experiments are as follows. We set G n be G 7 , where |D| = 1044 and |R| = 28. The results are shown in Fig. (2) where the point i in the x-axis denotes the graph g i , the point y in y-axis denotes the value 10 * and the value at the coordinate (i, y) is the value Rate(g i ) when the input graph is g i and = y/10.
The top figure in Fig. (2) shows the result when comparing the Ladder mechanism and the mechanism in Theorem 2. The below figure in Fig.  (2) shows the result when comparing the Ladder mechanism and the mechanism in Theorem 3, where δ = 1 for all the graphs in {g i : i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 100}}, and δ = 0 for other graphs in D. From Fig. (2) we can see the mechanism in Theorem 2 is better than the Ladder mechanism at most graphs. However, the mechanism in Theorem 3 is worse than the Ladder mechanism at those graphs of setting δ = 1. We reason that this is due to the the (almost) monotonicity of the triangle counting function.
Application in Linear Query
Linear query function (Definition 6) is a kind of well studied query functions in differential privacy [9, 8, 32, 33, 17] . Instead of treating batch linear queries, we treat a linear query. Batch linear queries can be treated by the combination of the method of this section and the functions compression method as discussed in Section 1.2.
We consider a special kind of the linear queries: the sum query. For the sum query, one dataset can be denoted as its histogram x ∈ R N , with x i denoting the number of occurrences of the ith element of the universe [8, 29] . As discussed in Section 3.4 we use the neighborhood set V f to denote the linear function f .
The details of the experiments are as follows. we consider four linear functions (over four differnt dataset universes) respectively. They are We implement the mechanisms in Theorem 2 and in Theorem 3 to these queries. The corresponding algorithms to evaluate the sequences {I x i } i and {R x i } i are similar with Algorithm 1 and are omitted. The only difference is that, since the linear query is symmetric for different datasets, each of the above two sequences is the same (when subtracting the corresponding f (x)) for different datasets. Therefore, we only need to evaluate the sequences for only one dataset. Note that the same value δ is assigned to different datasets due to the above symmetric property. Before giving the detailed experiments, we first give some theoretical results about linear queries. The above corollary is due to the symmetric property presented above which leads to α x = α y (the proof of Theorem 2) for different datasets x, y. Note that, for two neighbors x, x , the mechanisms in Corollary 1 reach the bound of the inequality (4) at all the points in I x i ∩ I x i+1 or all the points in R x i ∩ R x i+1 , i ∈N. We now discuss the convergence of the set sequences.
Definition 9 (The convergence of set sequence). Let V f be a linear query function over R. The corresponding set sequence {I i : i ∈N} is said to be convergent if there exist a n and n such that I n = a n ± [0, ∆f ] and I n+1 = a n ± [∆f, 2∆f ], where ∆f is the global sensitivity of V f . The accuracy of the mechanism M is measured using the expected value of the distance d(M(x), f (x)) as in Section 3.3, i.e.,
where set f (x) = 0, p(r) denotes the probability of r in the mechanism M when the input is x. We compare the accuracy of our mechanisms to the one in [32, Algorithm 1] (we call it Staircase mechanism). We evaluate the rate Rate = mean mean , where mean denotes the expected value E[d(M(x), 0)] of our mechanism and mean denotes the corresponding expected value of the Staircase mechanism. The results are shown in Fig. 3 where the x-axis denotes the values of δ, the y-axis denotes the value of and the value at the coordinate (δ, ) is the value Rate = mean mean for the definite δ and . In Fig. 3, We now analyze the results in Fig. 3 . The four queries V 1 , V 2 , V 3 , V 4 have the same global (and local) sensitivity ∆f = 1001. However, the volumes of their neighborhood set (Section 3.4) is different. Explicitly, Vol(V 1 ) = 2, Vol(V 2 ) = 101, Vol(V 3 ) = 501, Vol(V 4 ) = 1001. The Fig. 3 shows some interesting phenomenon: The more large of the value ∆f / Vol(V f ), the more better of our mechanisms compared to the Staircase mechanism.
Another interesting phenomenon is that the density functions of the first three functions in Fig. 3 are not monotonic (from the center to the two sides). This is counterintuitive since it is custom to assign less probability value to the point far away from f (x), such as the Laplace density function or the Gaussian density function.
Discussion
The {I x i } i sequence and the {R x i } i sequence contain many important properties about the corresponding query function f . The convergence property defined in Definition 9 is an useful property of the linear queries. However, there is linear query function, such as the function f with the codomain R = Z and the neighborhood set V f = {1, 7, 8, 10}, whose {I x i } i sequence and the {R x i } i sequence do not have the convergence property of Definition 9 but have other forms of "convergence" property: to the function f the volume of the sequences converge to 2∆f = 20. These "convergence" properties are need to be considered further. Furthermore, the property of the query function, such as the monotonic property, may have effect on the mechanism of the {R x i } i sequence. Moreover, how to appropriately assign δs in {R x i } i sequence for different datasets is still unknown.
Conclusion and Future Work
In differential privacy, the privacy-utility tradeoff is not well studied for general query functions except some linear queries, such as the counting query function. This paper gives a tentative exploration to the abstract treatment of differential privacy to treat the tradeoff. In this paper, the differential privacy problem is abstracted as finding a randomized mapping between two metric spaces. Two mechanisms are presented to construct the mappings for different query functions. They show a way to study the abstract differential privacy problems. Other methods are still needed to be explored to treat these problems.
Query functions should be categorized for the better understanding of differential privacy. One possible way is to use the properties of the {I x i } i sequence and the {R x i } i sequence of the query function, such as the convergence property of linear queries. The monotonic functions and the permutation functions defined in Section 3.4 seem more simpler or fundamental than other functions and therefore need to be studied firstly.
Furthermore, the connection between the abstract differential privacy in Section 3 and the randomized metric embedding needs to be considered. There are only works of treating the differential privacy problems using the metric embedding methods so far. We hope, in future, there may be some metric embedding problems solved by methods in the differential privacy.
Finally, one drawback of the mechanisms in this paper is the high complexity of the algorithms compared to the sensitivity-based one. How to construct low-complexity algorithms using the mechanisms of this paper needs to be considered.
